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SLAYING THE SACRED COW: LOOKING FOR CONSENSUS
IN THE REFORMATION OF WORLD AGRICULTURAL
TRADE
JOHN S. MARKLE*

There seem to be but three ways for a nation to acquire
wealth: The first is by war, as the Romans did, in plundering their conquered neighbors-this is robbery; the second by commerce, which is generally cheating; the third
by agriculture, the only honest way, wherein man
received a real increase of the seed thrown into the
ground, in a kind of continual miracle, wrought by the
hand of God in his favor, as a reward for his innocent life
and his virtuous industry.'
Benjamin Franklin
April 4, 1769
In the 18th century, Benjamin Franklin regarded agriculture
as a higher form of producing wealth. In the final years of the 20th
century, agriculture still holds the mystique that Franklin alluded
to. This mysticism is readily admitted by the 108 countries that
are participating in the Uruguay Round of the GATT negotiations.2 These countries hold agriculture as a sacred symbol of a
nation's wealth, security and well-being. Unfortunately, these
countries also have intervened in the world agricultural marketplace to such an extent as to cause overproduction, subsidy wars,
and an impending breakdown of the GAT system.
At the beginning of the Uruguay Round, the Punta del Este
Declaration declared that agriculture would be a top priority of
the upcoming round. As everyone suspected, slaying the sacred
cow would not be so easy.
* This article was selected as the first-place entry in the American Agricultural Law
Association's 1991 writing contest. The author is currently law clerk to Administrative Law
Judges Stephen L. Grossman, Thomas I. Megan, and Paul J. Fitzpatrick, Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission. B.A., State University of New York at Albany, 1988; J.D.,
Georgetown University Law Center, 1991.
1. GEORGE SELDES, THE GREAT THOUGHTS 142 (1985).

2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created in October 1947
by a group of countries (the Contracting Parties), with the basic idea that it would be an
agreement embodying the results of tariff negotiations among the Contracting Parties. The
GATT also included some general commitments. JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY,
LEGAL

PROBLEMS

OF INTERNATIONAL

ECONOMIC

RELATIONS

294

(2d

ed.

1986)

[hereinafter JACKSON & DAVEY]. Since the creation of the GATI', the Contracting Parties
have met to negotiate tariff reductions at Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) or
"rounds." The Uruguay Round, which began in 1986, is the eighth such negotiating round.
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INTRODUCTION
A.

THE SACRED POSITION OF AGRICULTURE

During the early years of the GATT, the two prime negotiators and free trade advocates, the U.S. and Britain, assumed agricultural trade would be treated the same as trade in other areas.
Therefore, the GATT agreement made minor exceptions for agriculture in three sections: Article XI-that prohibits quantitative
restrictions; Article XVI-that includes the rules for subsidies and
allows differing treatment for "primary" products and "non-primary" products; and Article XX-that involves a country's right to
restrict exports so as to "ensure essential quantities of such materials." 3 Except for these minor clauses, GATT was to be applied for
agricultural trade as it was in industrial trade.4
Such a promising start by the U.S. and Britain soon proved to
be too ambitious. In 1955, the U.S. requested and was granted a
special waiver under Article XXV of the GATT agreement. Under
this waiver, the Contracting Parties of the GATT agreed to allow
the U.S. to use import restrictions, in contradiction of Articles II
and XI of the GATT agreement, on such commodities as cotton,
peanuts and certain dairy products. 5 This waiver continues today.
While the U.S. waiver alone cannot be blamed for taking agriculture outside GATT perimeters, it did create a mind-set by which
the members of the GATT treated their domestic policies toward
agriculture as separate from GATT requirements. Soon after, in
the 1960s, the E.C. was organized under GATT Article XXIV paragraph 8(b) as a free trade area.6 This exception to GATT allowed
the European Community (E.C.) to implement its highly protective Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).7 Finally, using its
grandfathered rights under the Protocol of Provisional Application
(Protocol), Japan refused to give up its import restrictions concerning rice, meat and other products." Hence, by the early 1960s,
3. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 956.

4. Id.
5. Id.

at 957-59.
6. Id. at 458-59.
7. Under GATr Article XXIV paragraph 8(b), a free trade area:
[S]hall be understood to mean a group of two or more customs territories in
which the duties and other restrictive regulations or commerce . . . are
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constituent territories in
products originating in such territories.
JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC

RELATIONS 37 (2d ed. Supp. 1989). While the GATT has examined whether the E.C. and
the CAP fall under this exception, the GATT has never made a formal ruling on the matter.
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 462.
8. William M. Miner & Dale E. Hathaway, World Agriculture in Crisis: Reforming
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agriculture had been removed from the strict coverage of the
GATT.
From the mid-1960s to the present, agriculture has been virtually ignored by the seven multinational trade negotiations that
have taken place.9 In fact, government intervention in the agricultural market has increased substantially in the last few decades.
The problem is too large to ignore. As Clayton Yeutter, U.S. Secretary of Agriculture has stated, "Worldwide agricultural subsidies
plus the cost to consumers resulting from protectionist policies
now total about $150 billion yearly."' 10 Therefore, the privileged
position of agriculture has become a significant impediment to
trade and a large loss of economic efficiency. 1
However, in the Punta del Este Declaration, released at the
beginning of the eighth round of GATT negotiations, the Uruguay
Round, the Contracting Parties of the GATT put agriculture at the
top of its agenda. The Declaration stated:
Contracting Parties agree that there is an urgent need to
bring more discipline and predictability to world agricultural trade by correcting and preventing restrictions and
distortions including those related to structural surpluses
so as to reduce the uncertainty,12imbalances and instability
in world agricultural markets.
Government Policies, in WORLD AGRICULTURE TRADE: BUILDING A CONSENSUS 58 (1988)
[hereinafter Miner & Hathaway]. Under the "Protocol," Contracting Parties to the GATT
were allowed to "grandfather" existing legislation. This provided countries a method to
waive certain programs out of the reach of the GATT requirements. JACKSON & DAVEY,
supra note 2, at 298-300.
9. The seven previous negotiating "rounds" are as follows: Geneva (1947); Annecy
(1948); Torguay (1950); Geneva (1956); Dillon (1960-61); Kennedy (1964-67); Tokyo (197379). JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 324-25.
10. Statement of Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture before the House
Committee on Agriculture, July 19, 1989 (Washington, D.C.), quoted in ALAN CHARLES
RAUL & KEVIN J. BROSCH, GLOBAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS, Sept. 18, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT-TP File. The cost of world agricultural subsidies has
been estimated at $220 billion a year. David Crane, US.Congress Holds Key to Break
Trade Deadlock, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 12, 1991, at B1.
11. Specifically, the loss is in the efficiencies created by the operation of economic
forces as explained by the theory of "comparative advantage." The theory of comparative
advantage holds that when two countries produce two different commodities and each
country can produce one of the commodities more efficiently, each country will produce
the commodity it can produce more efficiently and will import the good that it cannot
produce as efficiently. This is the most economically efficient result since countries will be
compelled to produce those goods they are efficient at producing. However, as
governmental subsidies to agriculture have allowed inefficient farmers to continue
producing, governments have disrupted the competitive workings of the marketplace and
thereby have disrupted the economic forces that drive comparative advantage. See
JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 11-17.
12. SEYMOUR J. RUBIN AND MARK L. JONES, CONFLICT AND RESOLUTION IN US-EC

TRADE RELATIONS 303 (1989).
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The problem of agriculture has proved to be more troublesome than expected. The Uruguay Round, originally scheduled to
be concluded on December 7, 1990, was not successfully completed because of the continued disagreement over how to reform
agriculture.
On one side are the U.S. and the Cairns Group13 which are
seeking more liberal reforms. The U.S. and the Cairns group wish
to establish free trade in agriculture, devoid of harmful governmental intervention. On the other side is the E.C. and Japan,
which seek more conservative measures that would control government intervention in agriculture. The E.C. and Japan believe
reform will cause great hardship and therefore must be implemented at a much slower rate. There is no argument on the need
to reform. The argument concerns how far and how fast this
reform is to be implemented.
This paper will examine the approaches and arguments proposed by each side in the debate. While there are many players
and many issues in the agricultural debate, no one problem is as
important as the conflict between the U.S. and the E.C. The U.S.
and the E.C. both offer reforms, but take a fundamentally different
approach on how to achieve these reforms. This paper will compare and contrast the views and methods of each side. Specifically,
such ideas as "tariffication," "rebalancing," and a "two-price plan,"
will be examined. Much time will be spent examining the E.C.'s
CAP program, since it has proved to be a bane to those who wish
to liberalize world agricultural trade. Finally, this paper will criticize the approaches taken by the U.S. and E.C. and will suggest
some practical alternatives for reforming world agriculture.
Like no other aspect of international trade, agriculture has
taken on a domestic appeal that has forced nations to negotiate in
terms of pure self-interest. Due to the world's own ignorance,
farmers the world over have become addicted to government
intervention on their behalf. Breaking this addiction will require
more than half measures that only perpetuate the current system.
13. The Cairns Group is an organization of nations committed to the establishment of
free trade policies on a world wide level. The fourteen nations belonging to the Cairns
Group include: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Fiji, Hungary,
Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Philippines, Thailand, and Uruguay. DALE E.
HATHAWAY, AGRICULTURE AND THE GATIr: REWRITING THE RuLES 107 n.4 (1987). The
Cairns Group was formed in August 1986, with the specific pledge "to fight in the new
Uruguay Round for the complete abolition of agricultural subsidies that affect trade over a
period of time." Id. quoted in Alan C. Haul & Kevin J. Brosch, Global Trade in Agricultural
Products, Sept. 18, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, INT-TD File.

19921
II.

WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE

THE ADDICTION DEFINED
A.

THE STATE OF WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE

Since the GATT was formed, the trade in agriculture has
come under increasing protection by governments worldwide.
This especially has been true for industrialized nations. In fact,
"during the mid-1960s the nominal rate of trade protection
imposed on agricultural goods in industrial nations was about 21
percent. Today, it has climbed to about 40 percent."'1 4 In contrast
to the trade in industrial goods, the last thirty years of agricultural
trade has been a move toward increased protection by
governments.
The problem in agricultural trade stems from some recent
changes in world trade. During the 1970s, "[t]he application of
modern farming methods aided by scientific improvements, when
combined with price support programs and other government
subsidies, resulted in a phenomenal increase in productivity and
fostered intensive utilization of the agricultural land base.' 5 This
dramatic increase in supply, was not met with a corresponding
increase in demand. Hence, "[p]roductivity increases, which have
exceeded demand growth, have caused . . .[a] long-term downward trend in real prices. "16
The early 1980s brought an increase in real interest rates and
a worldwide recession that brought economic growth in developing nations to a halt.' 7 As a result of the worldwide recession,
developing countries were forced to reduce their imports of agricultural commodities.' 8 To protect the trade that countries had
gained in the 1970s, many governments created agricultural subsidies. As protection expanded, subsidy wars developed. Income
supports, border measures, export subsidies, export assistance programs, production subsidies, variable levies and other schemes
were developed by countries that shielded domestic farmers from
the instabilities of the world marketplace. As world supply
exceeded world demand, commodity prices fell. With subsidy
wars, increased government intervention, and falling prices, the
crisis in agriculture came to a head.
14. Text of Remarks Preparedfor Delivery by US Secretary of Agriculture Clayton
Yeutter to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ministerial
Meeting in Paris, France. Fed. News Serv., May 30, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Fednew File.
15. Miner & Hathaway, supra note 8, at 40.
16. Id. at 41.
17. Id. at 43.
18. Id.
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The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Develop-

ment (OECD) has sought to measure the extent of government
interference in agricultural trade. The OECD measures the support in Producer Subsidy Equivalents (PSEs). PSEs are defined as
"the value of transfers from domestic consumers and taxpayers to
agricultural producers."'

9

Specifically, PSEs are the percentage

value of production received by farmers. The worldwide total for
PSEs reached a high of $173 billion in 1987 which amounted to
almost half the income received by producers. 20 Total support has

decreased at an annual level of five percent each year, but it
remained at $141 billion for 1989.21 As a measuring device, PSEs

can be commodity-specific or can be used in the aggregate to estimate a country's average level of support.22 For instance, beef

from the U.S. has a PSE of around five percent, while the U.S.
aggregate PSE is approximately twenty-six percent.2 3

1. The Main Antagonists
World agricultural trade represents only ten percent of total
world trade, with earnings of around $500 billion per year.2 4 It is
not the percentage of world trade, but rather, it is the players in
this trade who make agriculture an important trade issue. The

E.C. and the U.S. account for approximately one-third of world
agricultural trade and nearly thirty percent of world agricultural
exports. 25 As world agricultural trade has been thrown into disarray in recent years, the U.S. and E.C. have become the main
antagonists on the world scene. While other trade issues may concern more money, there are few issues that have caused more

heated debate.
19. Gerard Viatte and Frederic Langer, Agricultural Reform: A Hesitant Start, 165
OECD OBSERVER, Aug./Sept. 1990, at 4 [hereinafter Viatte & Langer]. PSEs will be
discussed in greater detail later in the paper.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Id.
22. PSEs are calculated by measuring government budget outlays and other benefits to
farmers. They also include the income benefit to farmers as a result of restrictive border
measures. The benefits received from border restrictions are calculated as the difference
between the internal and external prices. US. ProposesEnding Farm Subsidies Worldwide
by 2000 at GATT Trade Talks, Daily Report for Executives, July 7, 1987, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Drexec File [hereinafter Daily Report].
23. Miner & Hathaway, supra note 8, at 51-52. The specific percentages represent the
amount of production value that the governments provide to producers in the form of
subsidies and market protection. Id. The OECD has computed average PSEs for countries
from 1979-85. Viatte & Langer, supra note 19, at 5. Some of the averages are as follows:
Australia (11%), Canada (30%), E.C. (35%), Finland (57%), Japan (64%), New Zealand
(23%), Norway (71%), Switzerland (67%), U.S. (26%). Id.
24. Mario de Cautin, Agriculture: Dispute on Subsidies Irreconcilable, Experts Say,
Inter Press Serv., December 11, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File.
25. FRANCIS G. SNYDER, LAW OF THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY 3-4 (1985).
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Problems have developed between the U.S. and E.C. in
recent years. During the Uruguay Round, the U.S. found itself as
the main supporter for the comprehensive reform of world agriculture. The E.C., on the other hand, has fought all attempts at
major reform. This paper will therefore examine what agricultural policy means to the E.C. and why the E.C. is currently
opposed to sweeping reforms.
III. CAP-OBSTACLE TO REFORM
A.

AN ORGANIZATION FOR UNITY

In 1957 the Treaty of Rome, the E.C.'s constitution, was
adopted. The symbol, indeed the centerpiece of this integrating
document, was the CAP. 6 The CAP is of such importance that it
is often called "the key symbol of European unity and integration-the glue that holds together the diverse nationalistic tendencies of the various member countries.12 7 The CAP sought to
ensure a stable supply of food stuffs and stable prices for farmers
and consumers.28 The CAP accomplished this through a system of
internal intervention and external protection. 9
Internal intervention involved ensuring that agricultural
prices did not fall below a certain set level, or "intervention
price." In this way, farmers were guaranteed a floor below which
prices would not fall. Farmers were further protected from
imported agricultural goods by the assessment of a "variable levy"
on those goods. This variable levy imposed upon imports is determined by taking the difference between the price of the good in
the E.C. and the price of the good in the world market. The variable levy ensured that high agricultural prices within the E.C.
would not cause imports to flood their market and force European
farmers out of business.
E.C. farmers also were benefitted by a program to ensure the
exportation of their agricultural products. 30 The problem was that
the internal intervention had the effect of raising the prices of
European agriculture higher than the world price. To overcome
this difference, the E.C. provided exporting farmers with "export
26. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
27. Ewen M. Wilson, The European Community's Common Agricultural Policy:
Continued Problemsfor the US., Heritage Foundation Reports, Dec. 5, 1990, availablein
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Hfrpts File.
28. OFFICIAL PUB. EuR. COMMUNITIES, A COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY FOR THE

1990s, 9 (5th ed. 1989) [hereinafter OFFICIAL PUBLICATION].
29. Id. at 18-19.
30. Wilson, supra note 27.
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'restitutions' or subsidies [that] are paid to E.C. farmers selling
their products overseas to close the gap between the high E.C.
internal price and the lower world price."'3 ' With export restitutions, E.C. farmers could be competitive with foreign producers.

B.

PROTECTOR TURNED PROVIDER

Take $44 billion from the European Community's taxpayers. Add $54 billion in extra payments by its consumers.
Devote this levy, equivalent to 2% of the E.C.'s GDP
(Gross Domestic Product), to improving the lot of only
7.5% of its workforce. Do it in a way that most helps the
the farmfarmers who least need helping, and most hurts
32
ers beyond the E.C.'s frontiers. That is CAP.
Obviously, this is a very cynical and sarcastic view of the CAP.
The unfortunate part is that it is, in many ways, true. As stated,
the CAP was designed to ensure an adequate supply of food for
Europe. Unfortunately, while the CAP did achieve food security it
also drove up food prices.
The overall result of the agricultural policies and development in European farming was an increase in production
at high and guaranteed price levels. This resulted in surpluses that created all kinds of problems: high budgetary
expenses but not the desired level of income for
farmers.3 3
Price stability and self-sufficiency carried a high price. In
recent years agricultural supports, as a percentage of the E.C.'s
total expenditures, have accounted for about seventy percent of
the total E.C. budget.3 4 Even upon the 1992 integration, it is estimated that the CAP will absorb sixty percent of Community
spending.35
The CAP has also had a considerable impact on international
trade. While the CAP's original goals were aimed at domestic supply, it performed so well that it transformed the E.C. from the
world's biggest importer of several commodities, to an aggressive
31. Id. at "'HOW THE CAP WORKS".
32. Farm Support Under Siege, ECONOMIST, July 14, 1990, at 3.
33. PETER COFFEY, MAIN ECONOMIC POLICY AREAS OF THE EEC-TOWARDS 1992 37

(2d rev. ed. 1988).
34. Id. at 45.
35. Leigh Bruce, Time to Slaughter the Sacred Cow,
MANAGEMENT 60 (une 1989).

44

INTERNATIONAL
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exporter.3 6 The CAP had turned from protector to provider. For
instance, "in the 1960s, the E.C. was the world's largest importer
of grains, purchasing about 20 million metric tons annually. Today
it is a major exporter, shipping out about 30 million metric tons
annually."'37 Between 1973 and 1984, Community exports rose by

154 %.38
By the early 1970s, the CAP had helped the E.C. reach selfsufficiency in most major agricultural products. 39 By the early
1980s, E.C. countries realized significant shares of export markets
long dominated by other countries. 40 The E.C. had achieved this
increased market share through the policies of the CAP. As a
result, many countries began to place political pressure on the
E.C. to do something about the effects that the CAP was having on
international trade.
IV.

THE MOVE TO LIBERALIZE WORLD AGRICULTURAL
TRADE
A.

SUBSIDY WARS AND A NEW CONSENSUS

With the CAP, the E.C. soon became a prominent player in
agricultural export trade. However, other countries, especially the
U.S., began countermeasures to hold on to their market share of
exports.4 1 When U.S. complaints about the CAP were ignored, the
U.S. began to retaliate with its own program of export subsidies.
The U.S. Food Security Act of 198542 drastically cut price supports
to American farmers. In their place was the use of explicit export
subsidies.4 3
36. Wilson, supra note 27, at "EFFECTS OF THE CAP ON WORLD MARKETS."
37. Id.
38. MICHAEL TRACY, GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURE IN WESTERN EUROPE: 1880-

1988 339 (3d ed. 1989).
39. OFFICIAL PUBLICATION, supra note 28, at 54.
40. In some markets, the E.C. had impressive gains. For instance, "the North African
wheat market once was dominated by America, Canada, and Australia; through export
subsidies, the E.C. increased it share of the market in Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia
from 2 percent in 1977 to 42 percent by 1980." Wilson, supra note 27.
41. The E.C.'s expansion in world agricultural trade has come at the expense of U.S.
exports. "Largely as a result [of E.C. subsidies], American farm exports have declined
drastically as a proportion of America's total exports, from a peak of 25% in 1974 to around
11% this year." The Wrath of America's Farmers,ECONOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 75. E.C.
increases in agricultural exports were also a major reason the U.S. share of world grain trade
slumped from approximately 50% in the late 1970s to 35% in 1985. Wilson, supra note 27.
42. Pub. L. 99-198, 99 Stat. 1354, 16 U.S.C. § 3831 (1988).
43. Id. The Food Security Act of 1985 directed that $2 billion in Commodity Credit
Corporation (CCC) funds be used as export subsidies. RAUL & BROSCH, supra note 10, at
10. The U.S. is also prepared for any future subsidy wars. The 1990 Farm Bill includes a
provision by which the federal government could restore up to $5 billion in export subsidies
to fight a subsidies war. George Gunset, Trade War Could Mean Farm Subsidy Restoration,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 31, 1990, at Cl.
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While the U.S. did gain back a substantial amount of its lost
market share,44 the flood of cheap agricultural products on world
markets caused prices to drop significantly. In turn, this caused
the E.C. to pay high export restitutions to counter the drop in
world prices. 45 This subsidy war brought the-problems in agriculture to the forefront. Therefore, a new world consensus that recognized the need for reform soon developed.
1. The Uruguay Objective
For the first time in the history of the multinational trade
negotiations, the Uruguay Round proclaimed agriculture as a top
priority.46 With this, the Contracting Parties sought to solve the
most difficult issue in the history of GATT. Six years later, the
round still has not been concluded, due to the conflict between the
U.S. and the E.C. concerning agricultural trade reform.
V. THE COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
A. THE U.S. POSITION
1. Comprehensive Reform
Adoption of our agricultural proposal would mean that
American farmers could compete against foreign farmers
based upon price and quality rather than the depth of a
foreign government's pocketbook or the height of a foreign government's trade barrier.47
The U.S. seized the initiative in July, 1987 by proposing a
comprehensive and ambitious plan for the reform of agricultural
44. By 1990, the U.S.'s share of world grain trade had rebounded from a low of 35% in
1985, back up to 46%. Wilson, supra note 27.
45. E.C. export subsidies also contributed to lower world agricultural prices. It has
been estimated that "E.C. exports alone drive down world food prices by 16%." Editorial,
Sacred Cows, NEW STATESMEN SOC'Y, July 13, 1990, at 4.
46. At the opening of the Uruguay Round, the Punta del Este Declaration was
released. It stated:
Negotiations shall aim to achieve greater liberalization of trade in agriculture
and bring all measures affecting import access and export competition under
strengthened and more operationally effective GAIT rules and disciplines,
taking into account the general principles governing the negotiations, by:
(i) improving market access, through the reduction of import barriers.
(ii) improving the competitive environment by increasing discipline on the use
of all direct and indirect subsidies . . . including the phased reduction of their
negative effects and dealing with their causes ....
RUBIN & JONES, supra note 12.
47. Press Conference with Clayton Yeutter, Secretary of Agriculture, and Carla Hills,
U.S. Trade Representative Re: US. Proposals Presentedat GATT on Trade in Services and
Agriculture, Fed. News Serv., Oct. 24, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew
File [hereinafter Press Conference].
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trade. 48 This plan proposed the "complete phase-out over 10

years of all agricultural subsidies which directly or indirectly affect
trade."'49 This included
all export subsidies, tariffs, quotas, and all
50
domestic subsidies.

The initial U.S. plan had a two-tiered approach. First, the
Contracting Parties to the GATT would have to decide how to
measure aggregate government support. Unlike tariffs, the forms
of agricultural protection across the world are varied and often are
not readily apparent. The most often mentioned measurement is
the PSE.5 1 The PSE measures the amount of income benefit that
producers receive from their government. There is a modified
PSE that is called a Trade Distortion Equivalent (TDE). Instead of
measuring the amount of total benefit, the TDE includes only the
interventions that distort trade. 2 That is, rather than including
both distorting and nondistorting government policies in the measurement, the TDE only includes those government actions that
affect production and cause distortion in the marketplace. Therefore, the TDE is a better indicator of how much individual countries are contributing to the distortions in the marketplace.
Once a level of aggregate support is determined, the Contracting Parties can then negotiate the specific policy changes that
are to be taken. Countries would then be held to their commitments, allowing for modifications where necessary. In this way,
supports can be reduced across the board. The U.S. and the Cairns
Group seek a seventy-five percent reduction in internal supports
and a ninety percent reduction in export subsidies. 3
2. Tariffication
Since its initial proposal, the U.S. has offered further ideas concerning the reform of agriculture. In 1989, the U.S. advanced a
novel proposal called "tariffication. ' '54 While the concept is not
new, it was a new idea for solving the agricultural problem. Tariffication involves the conversion of all nontariff agricultural trade
barriers into equivalent tariffs. 55 The idea is that once all trade
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
Nov. 7,
54.
July 13,
55.

Daily Report, supra note 22.
Id.
Id.
Viatte and Langer, supra note 19, at 5.
Miner & Hathaway, supra note 8, at 66.
Debra Percival, Trade: Can the Uruguay Round be Salvaged?, Inter Press Serv.,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Inpres File).
Richard Lawrence, US. Offers Novel Idea to Open Farm Trade, J. COMM. & COM.,
1989, at IA, col. 4.

Id.
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distorting measures are converted into more visible tariffs, the
levels of tariffs can be easily negotiated. During the phase-out,
countries could use a mix of tariffs and quotas until only tariffs
were remaining. Such tariff reduction has been a successful and
central part of GATT negotiations. Besides tarifllication, the U.S.
has also sought the gradual phase-out of export subsidies. 6
The U.S. is confident about the tariffication approach because
it was recently used in bilateral trade negotiations with the Japanese. In that case, the U.S. and Japan agreed to convert beef and
citrus quotas into tariffs.5 7 First, quotas and other import barriers
for beef were assessed an equivalent tariff of ninety-six percent in
Japan.5 8' Over the next five years, the Japanese agreed to remove
the quotas and barriers and lower the tariff to fifty percent, with
further reductions to be negotiated. At that time, according to the
the "U.S.-Japanese agreement [was] working
Secretary Yeutter,
59
beautifully."
The important aspect of the U.S. proposal is that it does not
matter to the U.S. how high the tariffs are set. As one article
stated:
[t]he Americans say they do not care if this calculation
produces a tariff of, say 200% or 250% on any farm product. The aim is to simplify the negotiations by producing
a concrete measure of protectionism, making it visible
and then eliminating it through gradual reduction, just as
gradual tariff reduction has worked in manufacturing.60
Later in the same year, Secretary Yeutter added the idea of
dividing internal support programs into a red, yellow and green
categories.6 1 Internal supports that distorted trade would be put
into the "red" category. These supports would be phased-out over
a period of ten years. Those supports that were less distorting
would be put into the "yellow" category. These supports would be
closely monitored, and negotiations would attempt to control their
effects. Finally, the supports such as income supports and conservation supports, which do not affect trade, would be placed in a
"green" category. Income supports, while arguably a subsidy,
generally do not affect trade, because they are not tied to produc56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id.
Id. at 3A.
A GA l77ing Gun for Farms, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 15, 16.
Id.
Farmers,Sinned Against, but not Sinless, ECONOMIST, July 8, 1989, at 25.
Press Conference, supra note 47.
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tion.62 Income supports serve to guarantee a minimum salary for
farmers, regardless of how much they produce. These supports
would not be limited, but would be seen as an alternative to the
present distorting mechanisms.
3. Decoupling
Decoupling represents a means of escape from collective
stupidity. By allowing prices to move and determine production levels, surpluses will disappear, production will
be located where costs are lowest, and a world price will
result that reflects the costs of meeting world food
needs.63
The concept of decoupling involves restructuring agricultural
policies so they do not have a distorting effect on trade. It is a very
attractive proposal since it seeks to disengage policy from creating
overproduction and allows the market to determine supply and
demand. Economically, it is an effective way to achieve the liberalization of world agricultural trade.
Decoupling is simple in design. It aims to convert price supports and other programs based on production into non-trade distorting programs which still assist the farmer. Instead of price
supports, export subsidies, and variable levies, the government
would implement land retirement schedules, acreage controls,
deficiency payment controls, income support, and minimum salaries for farmers. In this way, rather than adjusting supply, the government provides a safety net for farmers, while keeping
production in line with demand.
Unfortunately, while decoupling is economically wise, it may
be politically impossible. The problem with decoupling is that it
converts cheap government programs into an expensive support
system for farmers. Instead of consumers paying higher prices for
food, the government must provide farmers with direct financial
62. Hathaway has developed "An Illustrative List" of nontrade distorting and trade
distorting policies. HATHAWAY, supra note 13, at 104-06. While government intervention
can always be considered trade distorting at some level, Hathaway has divided the two by
looking at how these policies achieve their effects and the macro-effects of such policies.
Hathaway categorizes income supports, research grants, rural development money,
conservation programs, and farm loan programs as nontrade distorting. Id. Presumably, he
does this because these policies are not tied to production and generally do not affect
production by a large degree. On the other hand, price supports, production subsidies,
border measures, and export subsidies, which Hathaway considers trade distorting, have a
tremendous effect on production. Id. Throughout this paper, "nontrade distorting
policies" refers to those policies that have little affect on production.
63. John S. Marsh, An E.C. Approach to Decoupling, in WORLD AGRICULTURE, supra
note 8, at 149.
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assistance. In essence, decoupling takes "invisible" government
policies that raise food prices and turns them into very "visible"
support payments funded by the taxpayers. Seemingly, people
would rather pay higher food prices than pay higher taxes to support farmers. Even more unfortunate is that the payments to
farmers are seen as carrying the negative stigma associated with
64
"welfare" payments.
4. Liberalization
The above proposals all go toward fulfilling the U.S. goal of
liberalizing world agricultural trade. Liberalization, through the
elimination of trade barriers and subsidies, would utilize the
world's resources more efficiently. The more efficient use of
resources will, in turn, contribute to the overall growth in world
agriculture.6 5
As for benefits that individual nations would receive, the picture is somewhat mixed. Two economists, Rod Tyers and Kym
Anderson, have done an extensive study concerning such benefits. 66 As market distorting policies are eliminated, the liberalization of agriculture would have the general effect of increasing
world prices. In addition, in countries that have erected market
barriers or have provided subsidies for agriculture, there would be
a drop in internal prices as their markets adapted to renewed competition from exports.
Tyers and Anderson concluded that producers in the E.C.,
Japan and the U.S., the developed nations, would suffer a net loss
due to the loss of governmental supports that would be replaced
by the mechanics of the free market. 67 On the other hand, many
developing nations that can't afford expensive programs for subsidizing exports would experience a net gain because their products
would be more competitive with unsubsidized products from
developed nations.6 8 More importantly, all countries would gain
64. As one U.S. Congressman who equated decoupling with welfare stated, "I don't
think the American farmer wants something for nothing and I don't think the federal
government wants to encourage that sort of mentality." Barry Carr et al., A North
American Perspective on Decoupling, reprinted in WORLD AGRICULTURE, supra note 8, at
137.
65. A Policy Statement by Twenty-nine Professionals from Seventeen Countries,
Reforming World Agricultural Trade, in WORLD AGRiCULTURE, supra note 8, at 8
[hereinafter Policy Statement].
66. Miner & Hathaway, supra note 8, at 53 (citing R. Tyers and K. Anderson,
Distortions in World Food Markets: A QuantitativeAssessment WORLD DEVELOPMENT
REP., BACKGROUND PAPER No. 22 (1986)).

67. Id.
68. Miner & Hathaway, supra note 8, at 53.
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from a stable world market, and all consumers would gain from
lower internal food prices. Less-developed nations and developing nations would be forced to pay more for the food they import,
due to increases in world prices, but also would receive higher
prices for the food that they sold in the world market. Since these
nations are often agrarian-based, the benefits from receiving
higher prices for exports would most likely outweigh the costs
incurred from higher prices for imports.6 9

B.

THE

E.C. POSITION

1.

The Sanctity of the CAP

While understanding the need for liberalization in world agricultural trade, the E.C. has its own internal agenda. The effects of
liberalization openly conflict with the domestic goals of Community policy. There are many reasons why the E.C. cannot support
the reforms that the U.S. seeks.
First, there is the CAP. Recently, a former E.C. Commissioner argued, "[t]he only way to halt the damage done by the
E.E.C. Common Agricultural Policy is to abolish it. Several years
of tinkering have reduced the CAP to a morass of taxes, subsidies,
quotas, regulations and stabilizers."' 7 Yet, this is unlikely, since
the CAP represents the most important economic integration that
the E.C. has yet achieved. In addition the CAP has developed into
a large bureaucratic machine that has a life of its own.
Besides serving as the crowning achievement of integration,
the CAP also has many supporters. In the U.S., farmers number
2.5 million. In the E.C., farmers number 11 million and make up a
powerful lobbying organization.7 ' While the idyllic world of the
family farm has all but died in the U.S., the Europeans have a fixation with preserving the family farm. In fact, "[c]ommunity politicians have placed a high premium on sustaining the family
farm."'7 2 Therefore, while the world might press for reform of the
69. Policy Statement, supra note 65, at 8.
70. Godfrey Brown, Abolition of CAP, "the Only Way, " DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 29,
1989, at 6.
71. Bruce, supra note 35, at 61. In Greece and Portugal, the politics of farming are
especially important since farmers make up 28.5% and 22% of the respective populations
of those countries. OFFICIAL PUBLICATION, supra note 28, at 59.
72. John J. Marsh, Alternative policiesfor agriculture in Europe, 14 EUR. REv. AGRIC.
ECON. 12 (1987). As the Commission of the European Communities stated in a "Green
Paper," "[a]griculture on the model of the USA with vast spaces of land and few farmers, is
neither possible nor desirable in European conditions, in which the basic concept remains
the family farm." Id.
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CAP, its outright abolition is not a viable political alternative for
the E.C.
2. A Modest E.C. Proposal
During the first few years of the Uruguay Round of negotiations, the E.C. listened to ideas but neither took positions nor
offered its own program for reform. However, it was clear that the
E.C. could not afford the complete elimination of agricultural supports. As the E.C. argued, "[n]either the Community nor many
other countries where small and medium-sized farms predominate
were able to accept this suggestion, which would have meant the
end of the common agricultural policy and an end to farming on
millions of holdings in Europe." 3 As late as November 6, 1990,
the trade ministers from the various countries of the E.C. still
could not agree on their own negotiating position at the Uruguay
Round."4 When the E.C. proposal finally came, it was quickly
rejected by the U.S.
First, the E.C. proposed that internal supports should be
reduced by ten percent to thirty percent (depending on the commodity) as measured by an aggregate measurement of support
(AMS) over a period of ten years.7 5
Second, the E.C. accepted the basic concept of tariffication,
with an important twist. The E.C. approach would divide their
tariffs into two components.7 ' The first component would be a
negotiated fixed rate. The second component would be a "corrective rate" that would continue to protect European farmers in
much the same way that the current variable levy does.
Third, along with tariffication the E.C. offered the concept of
"rebalancing. ' '7 7 Since the E.C. would be lowering tariffs on most
agricultural goods, it would seek increases in other agricultural
products to offset its sacrifice. Specifically, the E.C. would reintroduce custom duties on oilseeds and non-grain foodstuffs. 7 8 These
73.

OFFICIAL PUBLICATION, supra note 28, at 45.
74. Bruce Barnard and Keith M. Rockwell, E.. Still Struggles For an Agreement on
Farm Subsidies, J. COMM. & CoM., Nov. 6, 1990, at 10A.

75. E.G. Commission Approves Major ProposalforUruguay Round, PR Newswire, Oct.
4, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews File [hereinafter PR Newswire]. The
AMS would include price supports, direct supports and input subsidies. Id. The U.S., in
contrast, is seeking a 75% reduction over ten years. Id.
76. Fact Sheet on the E.C.'s Position of Agricultural Trade in the Uruguay Round of
Trade Talks, 7 Int. Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 46, at 1785 (Nov. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Fact
Sheet].
77. PR Newswire, supra note 75.
78. William Dullforce and Lucy Kellaway, Farm Talks Gap Seems Unbridgeable, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 1990, § I, at 4, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fintme File.
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duties had previously been zero.
Finally, on the important issue of export subsidies, the E.C.
argued that there would be no need to make a specific commitment on reducing these subsidies. The E.C. believed the reduction in internal supports would decrease export subsidies in
Europe because of the decrease in the difference between internal
prices and world prices."9
3.

The 30-30-30 Proposal

After failing to reach agreement by the Uruguay Round deadline of December 7, 1990, most of the Contracting Parties met in
Brussels. During the negotiations, hope was heightened by a proposal from the Swedish Agricultural Minister. He proposed what
became known as the 30-30-30 proposal. This program encompassed a thirty percent reduction in export subsidies, a thirty percent improvement in market access, and a thirty percent
reduction in internal supports.80
Many at the meeting looked at the proposal as an excellent
negotiating instrument. 8 This proposal took a middle ground
between the U.S.'s need for comprehensive reform and the E.C.'s
need for a lower percentage of reductions. However, Japan,
Korea and then the E.C. all rejected the proposal even as a negotiating document.82 While this proposal was ultimately rejected, it
offers a good example of the kind of compromise each side must
make to reach a solution to the world agricultural deadlock.
VI. CONSENSUS IN A WORLD GONE MAD
The key to solving the deadlock involves finding a middle
ground between the U.S. and E.C. positions. The Contracting Parties have attempted to find a middle ground for six years but have
failed. The main reason the negotiations are stalled is due to the
brinkmanship attitude that each side took into the talks. Simply
put, neither side thought the other side would be so adamant in
their convictions.
To begin with, both sides have "sinned" by causing major disruptions in world agricultural trade. While the CAP has obvious
distorting effects, U.S. policies are in many ways just as distorting.
79. PR Newswire, supra note 75.
80. The Atlantic Forum Breakfast Re: The Uruguay Round: The Road to Agreement,
Fed. News Serv., Jan. 14, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Fednew File.
81. Id.
82. Id.

624

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68:607

For instance, the E.C. emphasizes that "the U.S. spent $11,250 per
farmer on farm aid in 1987-almost five times what the common
agricultural policy cost per farmer. '8 3 The E.C. also highlights the
recent dramatic increase in export subsidies by the U.S. and how
these subsidies have increased the U.S. market share in the world
market.
Even if the U.S. can claim the "higher" ground because it is
attempting to liberate agriculture from the inefficiencies and evils
of government intervention, it is doing so for selfish reasons. It
must be remembered that while the E.C. is opposing reform due
to its own self-interest, the U.S. is doing the opposite for the same
reason. As one article noted:
[I]f food ever receives the type of free trade treatment
under GATT that has done so much to boost trade in
manufactured goods, American agriculture would come
into its own. America's huge swathes of fertile land and
the high productivity of American farmers should mean a
boom in exports at the expense of European
competitors.8 4
With the banner of efficiency as its guiding principle, the U.S. is
proposing reform, believing that it is in its own best interests to do
so. Therefore, it is important to realize that the positions taken are
influenced by more than just a commitment to free trade or managed trade. In fact, the economic realities of comparative advantage play an extremely important role in how each side decides its
approach to negotiations.
A.

FREE TRADE OR MANAGED TRADE?

The first decision that must be made is whether international
trade is to be free of government intervention or managed. It
seems intuitive that a truly free international market cannot exist
alongside the managed internal markets of the producing nations.
In essence, the markets must be basically free or basically
managed.
A managed world market is, however, unlikely. In the 19 7 0s
during the Tokyo Round, there was a proposal to manage markets
83. OFFICIAL PUBLICATION, supra note 28, at 43. Another statistic is that, "dairy cows
in the U.S. each receive about $1,400 of government cash-more than the gross domestic
product per capital on half the world's population." Editorial, Food Chains: Mrs. Thatcher
was Right. Europe's Farm Subsidies are Strangling the Third World, NEW STATESMAN
SOC'Y, Nov. 2, 1990, at 4.

84. The Wrath of American Farmers,supra note 41.
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on a commodity-specific level.8 5 Such an agreement for wheat had
been concluded during the Kennedy Round. However, as a commodity-specific approach was being considered at the Tokyo
Round, the Kennedy Round wheat agreement broke down due to
market pressures. In addition, a sugar agreement that was negotiated outside the Tokyo Round would breakdown under the world
market pressures of the early 1980s.86 With the failure of both
commodity agreements, the idea of managing agriculture at a
worldwide, commodity specific level came to pass. Therefore,
most of the Contracting Parties would agree that achieving worldwide managed trade by negotiating commodity specific agreements is not possible.
The world must then act together to create a world agricultural trade system essentially based on the free market mechanism. It must be recognized that some government intervention
is a necessary evil of agricultural trade. Due to the unique characteristics that bind agriculture to the uncertainties of nature, governments across the world are required to provide mechanisms to
deal with such instabilities. Yet, it is also important that the Contracting Parties act in unison to lessen the trade distorting effects
that these policies create in the world market.
B.

CEASE-FIRE

Before a peace can be negotiated, the firing must stop. Therefore, the first step to a GATT agreement would entail a cease-fire
by which all nations would agree to freeze all trade distorting
measures. The U.S. does not agree with this idea, because it argues
that if a freeze is negotiated, many countries would simply accept
the freeze and not negotiate further. Therefore, the U.S. will not
accept a cease-fire until a comprehensive agreement is reached.
The U.S. position is arguably a strong one. The withholding of
a cease-fire agreement is a good bargaining chip in negotiations.
Yet, as long as the negotiations remain stalled, the subsidy wars go
on and ignite tensions the world over. For instance, in August
1990, while the Uruguay negotiations were continuing in earnest,
the E.C. increased the use of export subsidies.8 7 The Bush Administration soon followed with a sharp criticism. 88 Such an incident
85.
86.
87.
Aug. 8,
88.

HATHAWAY, supra note 13, at 142.
Id. at n.6.
E.E.C. Increases Use of Export Subsidies, Say US. Officials, Xinhua News Agency,
1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Xinhua File.
Id.
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did not help the negotiating process.
Hence, the U.S. must compromise on this important starting
point. A freeze on trade-distorting measures would not freeze
market share nor disadvantage anyone, as long as negotiations continued. A world consensus for reforming world agricultural trade
now exists. It is highly unlikely that the countries involved would
be satisfied with a cease-fire without further reform. Therefore,
nothing can be accomplished until the shooting is stopped.
C.

THE NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE REFORM

A comprehensive approach requires that all government
measures which create distortion in trade must be on the table.
The Europeans wish to reduce only certain protective measures
and reduce them by a relatively small percentage. 89 A selective,
more limited approach will allow countries simply to change to
new formulas of protection which are not bound by agreement.
The U.S. strongly adheres to a comprehensive approach
because of the ease at which protective measures could be restructured so countries could maintain the same level of protection
without violating the bindings. The U.S. fears that a selective,
more limited approach will allow the perpetuation of the current
system, while the countries opposing reform could claim they are
sticking to their bindings. Therefore, binding all GATT members
to restrictions on certain actions or to certain percentages that do
not actually reduce protection is worse than no agreement at all.
A commodity-specific approach or an agreement only addressing
internal supports are inherently inadequate because they allow
protection to continue while it appears that such measures are
being reduced.
1. The Release of Waivers and GrandfatherRights
As stated earlier, soon after the GATT was created the U.S.
was granted a waiver that allowed it to violate GATT for certain
agricultural products.9" With this waiver, there exist certain practices that nations were allowed to "grandfather in" under the
"Protocol of Provisional Application. ' 91 This waiver and the many
grandfathered rights in agriculture continue today.
An important step would be to apply an upward limit on the
89. The E.C. has generally offered reductions less than 30%. The U.S. and the Cairns
Group seek reductions of at least 75%. Percival, supra note 53.
90. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 957-59.

91. Id. at 298-99.
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time duration of these waivers to the GAIT. It is possible that an
agreement could be reached that would phase-out these waivers
over a period of time. The U.S. could offer to phase-out its waiver
in exchange for the phasing-out of other nations' grandfathered
rights. The U.S., by eliminating its waiver rights, could thereby
eliminate what has become an embarrassing point and reap the
benefits by proving it is serious about the negotiations.
2. Reformation of the CAP
The CAP cannot exist in its current form if there is to be any
agreement on agriculture in the GATT negotiations. The CAP can
exist, but not as a shield to protect European agriculture from the
competition and instabilities of the international marketplace.
Unfortunately, the E.C. has resisted reforming the CAP at
every turn. An Official Publication of the E.C. states that "the
Community has shown that it is willing to make alterations to its
farm policy, but the basic principles of price support with the aid
of import levies and export refunds cannot be called into question."'9 2 The E.C. must enter negotiations with everything on the
table. By holding the CAP untouchable, the E.C. insures the deadlock that now exists.
On the other side of the table, the U.S. and other Contracting
Parties must realize the importance of the CAP to Europeans and
the unique political problems the reformation of the CAP poses for
the Europeans. The CAP is the symbol of E.C. unity and has many
powerful supporters in Europe. The key, however, is that the
CAP can and must be reformed.
The CAP can be reformed by changing its structural policy, its
level of protection, or the focus of its protection. A change in
structural policy would require the shifting of agricultural workers
into other vocations. Due to the European "romance" with rural
society and the present unemployment problems in the E.C., 93 a
change in structural policy is not likely.
A change in the level of protection might include a lowering
of price supports. However, lowering price supports would lower
farmers' incomes, and "[t]he income position of farmers is an
important aspect of agriculture policies in Europe and this policy
line [of reducing price supports] is therefore not generally accept92. OFFICIAL PUBLICATION, supra note 28, at 45.
93. "In the European Community, the major problem during the last five years has
been unemployment." Paul Luyten, The GAT and the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations: The E.. Perspective, in RUBIN & JONES, supra note 12, at 23.
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able in real politics. 94
While all countries have run into major economic and political
problems in reducing price supports, both Australia and New Zealand have recently succeeded in substantially lowering their price
supports. 95 In Australia, the government abolished market price
supports for dairy products and wheat.96 In New Zealand, there
has been "the reduction in customs duties for certain meats, the
abolition of the New Zealand Poultry Board... and the decrease
by a third in budget aid to agriculture."9 " Hence, if governments
have the political will and resolve, they can reduce agricultural
supports by significant amounts.
While a decrease in price supports of the magnitude that Australia and New Zealand recently achieved is probably not acceptable in the E.C., it could be possible for the E.C. to negotiate an
upper limit on the variable levies it applies to imported goods. As
with tariffication, the upper limit of the variable levies could be
very high at first. This would be a major step in getting the E.C. in
line with world prices. Specifically, the E.C. would be agreeing to
a limit on variable levies, which would act like a "bound tariff."9 "
Then, as liberalization in world trade began and world prices
increased, the variable levy would become smaller and smaller.
The E.C. could then negotiate decreases in its "bound tariff."
Thus, the need for a variable levy may disappear altogether if the
remaining suggested policies are incorporated into the reforms.
The major problem with placing an upper limit on the variable levy is that if import prices fell below the support price, the
E.C. would be flooded with the cheaper foreign imports. In such a
case, the E.C. would have to exceed the bound limit in order to
maintain the market share within its internal market. However,
this would not occur if a comprehensive approach seeking to liberalize world agriculture and E.C. agricultural production is taken.
This is because a comprehensive E.C. approach would gradually
shift the E.C. to non-distorting policies untied to production. The
94. COFFEY, supra note 33, at 47. The article goes on to state that when such a policy
was "applied to cereals in 1985 it created much political tension in the Community." Id.
95. Viatte and Langer, supra note 19, at 5.
96. Id.
97. Id. New Zealand has been so successful with its restructuring and reducing of
support that its PSE, as determined by OECD, has decreased from an average of 23% for
the years between 1979-1985, to a mere 5% in 1989. Such an impressive decrease proves
that a country can reverse government intervention.
98. GATr tariff commitments, sometimes called the "bindings" of a country, are
contained in a series of schedules which are appended to the GATI agreement and
incorporated into it by reference in Article II of GAT7. JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at
395.
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E.C.'s internal prices would slowly become more market dependent and, therefore, closer in value to world prices. In addition, a
worldwide approach to reducing trade distorting policies would
cause world prices to increase as the world market came into supply and demand equilibrium. Hence, the reasons behind the variable levy would no longer exist.
Finally, the CAP could be reformed by changing the focus of
protection from price supports to non-distorting income supports.
A change to income supports would entail direct payments to
farmers to compensate farmers for lower prices caused by the
decrease in price supports. As in the U.S., income support payments are perceived as "welfare" for farmers. Farmers don't want
to be paid income that is unrelated to their production. The E.C.
recently considered direct income payments but rejected them
because these payments had a "low rate of return and would
require a large budget." 99 Apparently, the E.C. believes that
income payments would cost more than, and are not as efficient as,
price supports. However, income supports would only go to those
small family farmers who truly needed support. 1°° Also, considering that agricultural supports take up sixty to seventy percent of
the total E.C. budget, the current price supports are not cheap,
nor less visible than direct income payments. Therefore, while
non-distorting income payments cannot totally replace a price
support system in Europe, they could go a long way in reducing
the hardship caused by the decrease in price supports.
Within the confines of the CAP, the E.C. could develop new
policies that would seek to decrease production. The U.S. is the
only country that reduced production in the 1980s. 10 1 The U.S.
accomplished this by a massive land retirement program that
began in 1983.102 While the E.C. has begun such a program, it
would do well to expand it to help reduce the world's overproduction problem.
Besides land retirement, other production reducing programs
could also be initiated. The E.C. could pass a production quota
99. COFFEY, supra note 33, at 47.

100. If the E.C. is truly concerned with protecting the small family farm, income
support, which could guarantee the small farm a minimum income, would be more
effective than price supports. Price supports favor those who produce more, because these
supports are tied to production. That is, the more one farmer produces, the more that
farmer benefits. The large farms benefit greatly from price supports, while the small
farmer, who produces much less, receives much less support. Hence, income support is a
better policy tool for preserving the small family farm.
101. HATHAWAY, supra note 13, at 23.
102. The U.S. used a payment-in-kind system, which withheld 77.9 million acres of
land from crop production. Id. at 83.
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that restricts agricultural production by farmer or by units per
land. While the farmers will jealously guard their right to produce
how much they want to produce, a program instituting a production quota is possible. The E.C. could pass a program that requires
farmers to keep a certain percentage of their land fallow or
require them to diversify into different crops. Whichever method
the E.C. chooses, it must decrease its production.
To reduce production, one article proposed a two-price plan
in which there would be a "price" given for goods sold domestically and another "price" for exported goods. 10 3 In essence, there
would be two variable levies, one for products that are consumed
domestically, and another for products that are to be exported.
The levy given to products consumed domestically would be
higher than the levy given to products produced for export. With
this system, farmers would not be so inclined to produce goods for
export, since those goods would sell at a lower price than the same
goods sold on the domestic markets. The article persuasively
argued that the use of either a production quota or a two-price
plan was economically superior to either a price reduction or a
drop in the variable levy. 10 4 The E.C. could even agree to reduce
production by these methods in exchange for other nations agreeing to decrease production across the board by a certain percentage each year.
As with all solutions, the answer to reforming the CAP is a mix
of measures, all going toward reducing the protective and productive capabilities of the CAP. The E.C. must reduce its reliance on
price supports and increase the use of direct income supports.
The E.C. also must agree to bind its variable levies at some level.
The E.C. cannot flood the international markets with its products,
while erecting a fortress to protect its farmers from the low prices
its goods are creating in the world market. Finally, the E.C. must
seek ways to limit its productive capacities. Whether by land
retirement, production quotas, a two-price plan, or by the requiring of fallow land, the E.C. must reduce its overproduction.

103. Harry de Gorter and Karl D. Meilke, Efficiency of Alternative Policies for the
E.C.'s Common Agricultural Policy, 71 AMER. J. AGRIC. ECON. 592 (1989). The "price"
would actually be determined by the difference in the support given to each product.
104. Id. The article involved a complex economic efficiency analysis of a price
reduction, corresponding levies, production controls and a two-price plan. In terms of the
efficiency in achieving producer welfare, the two-price plan and production quota were
superior to the other two. Id.
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Tariffication and Decoupling

The E.C. has accepted the concept of tariflication, but also
requires the continuation of a "corrective factor" to account for
the lower price within the Community. Such a position is simply a
continuation of past policies and is a smoke and mirror routine to
perpetuate the isolation of European agriculture.
However, tariffication does hold real promise as a method of
removing myriad protectionist devices now being used the world
over. First, the Contracting Parties would have to agree on a measuring instrument for computing the aggregate levels of protection in the world. The PSE is too broad a measuring device, since
it measures all the benefits that governments bestow to farmers.
That is, the PSE measurement includes both the harmful trade distorting policies and the relatively harmless non-distorting policies.
The modified TDE, which includes only those government measures that cause distortions in trade, is the better measurement to
use. The TDE, by focusing on only trade distorting policies, gives
a much more accurate approximation of the level of harmful intervention each country is causing on world agricultural trade.
Once the measuring device was determined, the Contracting
Parties would then have to agree on what policies are and are not
trade distorting. These negotiations are more economically based
and agreement may be easily reached considering the room for
compromise in this area. In fact, "[a] general classification of agricultural policy instruments would serve as a means of engaging in
negotiations on types of programs in a broad, comprehensive manner, rather than in a specific commodity and instrument context."' 1 5 Such a classification system would be an important step
in achieving tariffication and the decoupling of agricultural
policies.
The E.C. tempers its acceptance of the tariffication approach
with the idea of rebalancing. The E.C. argues that since Europeans would be lowering their tariffs on most agricultural goods,
their sacrifice should be offset by allowing the E.C. to increase the
tariffs they collect on "cereals substitutes, derivatives and oilseeds.' 0 6 However, as the USTR has pointed out, "[n]o GATT
round has ever included raising bound tariffs as a vehicle for meeting market access commitments .... The E.C. wants to unilaterally determine the bindings to be broken and to 'pay' nothing in
105. Miner & Hathaway, supra note 8, at 81.
106. PR Newswire, supra note 75.
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return."10 7 The idea of raising tariffs to compensate a country for
its efforts in liberalizing trade is totally contrary to the ideals and
goals of the GATT. The E.C. should look at the benefits flowing
from sacrifices made by other nations. Rebalancing simply has no
place in multinational trade discussions concerning trade
liberalization.
Using the TDE, the Contracting Parties of the GATT could
determine the level of aggregate support that each government is
providing to its producers. Then there would be multilateral
negotiations concerning the creation of comparable tariffs and
agreements on a time table for eliminating the distorting practices. These tariffs, while high at first, could then be negotiated
downward in the same way tariffs on industrial goods have been
negotiated.
Closely related to the concept of tariffication is the idea of
decoupling. Specifically, while tariffication seeks to convert trade
distorting policies into tariffs, a decoupling strategy seeks to convert trade distorting policies into non-distorting policies while still
protecting farmers. The idea of decoupling is not controversial in
the abstract, since the goal of decoupling is to eliminate the policies that create distortions in trade. It is important to note that no
country believes agriculture can exist without government intervention. All countries understand the need for emergency disaster relief measures, conservation programs, income transfers, and
market flow controls. The problem exists with trade distorting
policies.
Decoupling seeks to decrease the world's reliance on trade
distorting policies and increase those policies with little to no
effect on trade. The problem is that many non-distorting policies
are expensive. Since these programs require taxpayer's dollars,
they quickly become politically impossible. Therefore, while nondistorting policies cannot completely replace distorting policies,
they can be used to ease the world into liberalization.
4.

A Stronger GATlT

Clearly agriculture must be brought into GATT rules. Currently, Article XVI of the GATT states that subsidies "shall not be
applied in a manner which results in that contracting party having
more than an equitable share of world export trade in that pro107. Fact Sheet, supra note 76.

1992]

WORLD AGRICULTURAL TRADE

633

duce.... "108 Unfortunately, no one really knows what an "equitable share" is or how it is to be measured. Attempting to control
subsidies by defining their effects has proven to be ineffective in
limiting their use.

Therefore, the GATT needs to be rewritten with a section
devoted to agriculture. This section should include a broad definition of "subsidy," 109 and then go on to list the distorting versions
that are being phased-out, with an eventual ban on these policy
instruments. To make reform comprehensive, the frequently used
"voluntary restraint agreements" (VRAs) also should be brought
into GAT'T.110 While a total ban on VRAs on all industrial and
agricultural products would be a goal, the Contracting Parties

could possibly agree to cut back on their use in certain areas. In
this way, they could experiment with ways to eliminate the appli-

cation of VRAs. It is possible that VRAs could be required to be
voted on by the other Contracting Parties, or at least presented to
and filed by the GATT."'
Another proposal for the GATT? would be to create a panel to
monitor the eventual agreement that is produced on agriculture.
108. The GATT Subsidies Code further defines "more than an equitable share," by
adding,
2. For purposes of Art. XVI:3 of the General Agreement and paragraph 1
above.
(a) "more than an equitable share of world export trade" shall include any case
in which the effect of an export subsidy granted by a signatory is to displace the
exports of another signatory bearing in mind the developments on world
markets;
(b) with regard to new markets traditional patterns of supply of the product
concerned to the world market, region or country, in which the new market is
situated shall be taken into account in determining "equitable market share";
(c) "a previous representative period" shall normally be the three most recent
calendar years in which normal market conditions existed.
GATT Subsidies Code art. 10, § 2, reprintedin JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM J. DAVEY,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 80 (2d ed. Supp. 1989).
While the Subsidies Code has added predatory export subsidies as an example, the idea
of traditional markets, and a representative period, "more than an equitable share"
approach, cannot be further refined by more definitions or guideposts simply because it is
an inherently undefinable term.
109. "Subsidy" could be defined as broad as to include, "any program operating
through government, or using powers granted by governments, that results in producer
prices (including payments) that are above prices in world markets for the products
involved." HATHAWAY, supra note 13, at 126. Such a broad definition has had radical
.effects in determining subsidies in U.S. countervailing law. However, this definition of
subsidy is not broadly defined in order to create more countervailing duty cases, but rather
to ensure that all significant trade distorting policies are included in the definition. The
important part of the proposed solution is its focus on the defining and phasing-out of
distorting subsidies.
110. A "voluntary restraint agreement" is an action of restraint by an exporting
country taken because of its concern that unilateral quotas would otherwise be imposed
against it by an importing country ....Stanley D. Metzger, Injury and Market Disruption
From Imports, reprinted in JACKSON & DAVEY, supra note 2, at 610.
111. HATHAWAY, supra note 13, at 148.
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Specifically, this panel would be responsible for measuring TDEs
for all countries involved and supervising the move from distorting to non-distorting government instruments. Along with this
panel, would be a new committee that would handle disputes and
suggest ways to correct problems.' 1 2 A revised GATT with more
precise and more strict language concerning the elimination of
distorting agricultural subsidies could prove a workable system
while greatly strengthening the credibility of the entire GATT
system.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The GATT system and its centerpiece of multilateral trade
negotiations currently sits at the verge of destruction because of
the problems being encountered in negotiations over agriculture.
The U.S. and E.C., by continued brinkmanship, will only further
weaken GATI' and may even threaten its very existence as a viable system.
To overcome the intransigence on both sides, a middle
ground must be found. This requires the E.C. to make serious
efforts to reform the CAP and reduce its trade distorting effects.
As has been shown, the E.C. has many options open to it. Income
supports, internal production quotas, land retirement plans, tariffication, decoupling, a "bound" variable levy, or a two-price plan all
offer innovative methods to reforming the CAP. A careful selection of policies would go a long way in alleviating the large discrepancy between the European domestic market and the world
market.
The U.S. also has many policy options it needs to carry out to
ensure compromise. The U.S. needs to agree to a cease-fire and a
set time limit for its waiver. In addition, the U.S. must realize that
the problems created by government intervention are extensive
and cannot be eliminated in too short a period. The U.S. must
agree that a slower enactment of reforms will be necessary to limit
the hardships that the world's farmers are going to suffer.
The 30-30-30 proposal has a unique mix of compromises that
seemed an excellent negotiating document. This proposal offered
a comprehensive approach at lower percentage levels that seem to
be acceptable to the E.C. Unfortunately, Korea, Japan, and the
112. A new panel and dispute settlement system has been suggested by several
commentators. The most succinct and thoughtful system is suggested by Miner &
Hathaway, supra note 8, at 75.
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E.C. did not believe it was an acceptable starting point. By showing more flexibility, the U.S. may yet pull off such a comprehensive
agreement. If the E.C. and others still refuse, they must live with
the subsidy wars and increased protection that will severely contract the international market.

